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 Much environmental activism is caught in a logic that plays science against 
emo-tion, objective evidence against partisan aims, and human interest against 
a nature that has intrinsic value. Radical activists, by contrast, play down the 
role of sci-ence in determining environmental politics, but read their solutions 
to environ-mental problems off fixed theories of domination and oppression. 
Both of these approaches are based in a modern epistemology grounded in 
the fundamental dichotomy between the human and the natural. This binary 
has historically come about through the colonial oppression of other, non-
Western and often non-binary ways of knowing nature and living in the 
world. There is an urgent need for a different, decolonised environmental 
activist strategy that moves away from this epistemology, recognises its 
colonial heritage and finds a different ground for environmental beliefs and 
politics. This book analyses the arguments and practices of anti-GMO activists at 
three different sites – the site of science, the site of the Bt cotton controversy 
in India, and the site of global environmental protest – to show how we can 
move beyond modern/colonial binaries. It will do so in dialogue with Gilles 
Deleuze, Bruno Latour, María Lugones, and Gayatri C. Spivak, as well as a 
broader range of postcolonial and decolonial bodies of thought. 
  Doerthe Rosenow  is Senior Lecturer in International Relations at Oxford 
Brookes University. She is interested in the theorisation and analysis of political 
struggle in relation to understandings of nature, particularly from perspectives 
that engage notions of materiality and (de-)coloniality. Her research is 
interdisciplinary, cross-ing over the boundaries of International Relations, 
political theory, human geog-raphy, anthropology, and continental philosophy. 
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 Tucked away in the countryside of Northern Germany lies the Wendland, which 
is a region that to the outsider does not stand out in any particular way. But 
over the past 40 years the Wendland has become a significant location for 
German anti-nuclear power activists, after a salt dome in one of its small 
villages – Gorleben – was chosen to be the  Zwischenlager  (intermediate 
storage facility) for Germany’s nuclear waste in the 1970s. Today the Wendland 
means a lot to Germans like me who have undergone their initiation into 
environmental activism by participat-ing in the protests against nuclear waste 
transports that make their way to Gor-leben on a yearly basis. In these 
protests, Greenpeace activists join anarchists as well as local farmers to 
occupy rail tracks and roads. In fact, the whole Wend-land population 
participates, with the anti-nuclear symbol ‘X’ being exhibited in many windows. 
I still vividly remember my own 2003 Gorleben protest in which I was given a 
lesson on the merits of the former Socialist German Democratic Republic at 
the booth of the Marxist-Leninist Party and learned about the dan-gers of 
nuclear power at the Greenpeace stall, while my partner – a Greenpeace 
activist – danced with a fiddler and his children on the occupied rail tracks. At 
the time, being a German environmentalist for sure meant to be ‘anti’: anti-
nuclear power, anti-biotechnology, anti-rainforest logging and, already looming 
on the horizon, anti-man-made climate change. 
 Since that time the once clear waters of my environmental beliefs have become 
muddied. Environmentalists have started to prominently discuss whether 
some environmental issues are more significant than others, and whether 
there are even outright contradictions between the various ‘anti’-positions. In 
the UK, where I have been living at the time of writing for more than a 
decade, the renewed commitment to nuclear power is (among other things) 
justified by pointing at the need to protect the climate, based on the 
argument that the nuclear industry is allegedly low carbon. This is an 
argument not just made by the UK govern-ment (see e.g. Leadsom, 2016), but 
also by some prominent environmentalists. George Monbiot, for example, 
argues that the fighting of nuclear power is coun-terproductive for 
environmentalists insofar that it distracts them from the prob-lems that really 
matter, such as the CO2 emissions of the coal industry (which, Monbiot (2013) 
suggests, can only be tackled by advocating an energy mix that includes 
nuclear power). Similarly, some argue that the issue of climate change 
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should make us environmentalists change our attitude towards agricultural 
bio-technology, the activism around which lies at the heart of this book. 
Environ-mentalist and popular writer Mark Lynas, for example, publicly 
‘converted’ to a pro-genetically modified organisms (GMO) position based on 
the argument that he has to be consistently ‘pro’- or ‘anti’-science. He cannot, 
so his reasoning, be ‘anti-science’ in relation to agricultural biotechnology, 
whilst being ‘pro-science’ in relation to climate change (Lynas, 2015). There is, 
he (ibid.) maintains, a sci-entific consensus for both the actuality of man-
made climate change and the safety of GMOs. 
 What are the reasons for this professed desire to organise into a hierarchy 
and/or play against each other environmental beliefs, with agricultural 
biotechnology and nuclear power being two of the most prominent issues 
losing support among at least some environmentalists?  1  As Lynas’s comments 
make clear, the distinc-tion between ‘proper’ and ‘improper’ environmental 
beliefs is often grounded in science as the decisive site for verifying claims 
about how nature needs to be protected best. Indeed, those 
environmentalists who continue to be concerned about agricultural 
biotechnology often counter pro-biotech arguments with the same logic: they 
point out that the ‘evidence’ for a pro-position is either not there or that it is 
inconclusive; in other words, they contest the idea that there really is a 
scientific consensus. This is often related to the allegation that those in favour 
of biotechnology are not independent scientists, but are compromised by their 
ties to industry (see e.g. Robinson, 2015). In fact, as I was writing the first 
version of this introduction, Riverford veg box scheme owner Guy Watson 
responded in the newsletter that accompanied my box for that week to a pro-
GMO BBC  Panorama episode that had just been aired in the following way 
(Watson, 2015; emphasis added): 
 Iremain open-minded about the benefits that GM might bring in the future . . . but . . . 
bombarding us with  emotive messages  driven more by a PR agenda than by  
fact is unforgivable. We need, rather, a cool headed evaluation of the scientific 
evidence and the commercial interests at play . 
 One of the most interesting features of this quote is the binaries that it invokes, 
which also (at least implicitly) structure the arguments of those in favour 
of biotech: the ‘cool’ scientific versus the ‘emotive’ other, ‘pro’ versus ‘anti’-
science, (objective) ‘evidence’ versus (commercial or otherwise partisan) 
‘interests’. 
 In this book I will argue that this urge towards binarisation is grounded in 
a taken-for-granted modern epistemology that is delimiting our 
understanding of nature, reality and political transformation. Crucially, this 
epistemology has his-torically come about through oppressing and annihilating 
other, non-Western and often non-binary ways of knowing nature and living in 
the world, which is why I call previously mentioned binaries not just  modern , 
but also  colonial . What interests me in this book is what sort of environmental 
politics and activist strat-egy could emerge if we moved away from this 
epistemology and dropped this urge towards binary categorisation, if we 
acknowledged its colonial heritage and 
(consequently) found a different ground for environmental beliefs, values 
and politics more generally (cf. Braun, 2002)? 
 There are of course other, more radical forms and arguments of/in 
environmental activism. Indeed, the approach outlined so far could be called a 
mainstream, ‘paci-fied’, evidence-based one that usually complies with 
paradigms such as ecological modernisation, sustainable development and 
green growth. Such an approach sees effective governmental regulation as the 
best response to enduring environmental problems, instead of trying to change 
the fundamental oppressive socioeconomic structure of society. This 
institutional approach to ‘saving’ the environment has always stood in 
‘historical tension’ with more radical environmental Marxist or anarcho-
autonomist branches (Reitan and Gibson, 2012: 396–7). However, one of the 
contributions of this book lies in the argument that it is not only mainstream 
environmentalists that sign up to a modern/colonial epistemology, but also, 
as I will outline in one of the following sections of this introduction, many 
radi-cal activists and scholars. Drawing on decolonial thought (e.g. Quijano, 
2007; Mignolo, 2000), I will argue that radicals, while acknowledging that other, 
non-Western ways of making sense of nature have been ignored and 
suppressed in  political and socioeconomic practice , often neglect the way that 
Marxist, anar-chist, deconstructivist or otherwise radical Eurocentric  concepts 
and categories continue to suppress alternative bodies of knowledge about the 
world. 
 This book engages with a particular environmental issue and the activism 
against it: agricultural biotechnology/GMOs. This issue is interesting because two 
of the rationales that underlie activists’ fight against GMOs have in 
themselves the potential to disrupt modern/colonial binaries. First, anti-GMO 
activists who continue to argue against biotechnology do so, as Lynas rightly 
points out,  against the scientific consensus. However, that does not mean that 
they altogether aban-don the scientific argument: drawing on complexity 
science they maintain, against mainstream molecular biology, that the organism 
(and/or nature as such) is a com-plex, self-coordinating entity that cannot be 
externally controlled. As I will show in  Chapter 2 , they contest the traditional 
binary between the scientist as subject and the organism as object and instead 
depict observer and observed as intermin-gled. With this they at least implicitly 
go against the crucial modern mind/matter dichotomy as well as related 
understandings of cause and effect working in a linear manner, and the 
possibility of predictability and control. Some anti-GMO activists see the latter as 
being the outcome of a human chauvinistic attitude towards nature that needs 
to be overcome. At least at a first glance, this argument seems to be close to 
many non-Western cosmologies in which the human and the nonhuman have 
never been as clearly distinguishable as they have been for the modern 
subject. However, as I will also show in  Chapter 2 , when it comes to the concrete 
politi-cal argument that activists make about GMOs, modern/colonial binaries 
re-enter the picture, particularly when a strong distinction is made between 
the ‘natural’ organism and the ‘unnatural’ GMO. Paradoxically, this distinction is 
based on the assumption that the GMO is a bounded entity the identity of which 
can yet again be described on the basis of inherent, fixed and stable properties 
(rendering it ‘unnatu-ral’). This too easily leads to a call for excluding and 
destroying the ‘unnatural’ or 
‘monstrous’, as well as a collapsing of the true and good into the ‘natural’. As I 
will show particularly in  Chapter 4 , both moves have very problematic implica-
tions for the way that non-Western cultures, societies and bodies of knowledge 
are perceived, judged, appreciated and/or excluded. 
 The second rationale of anti-GMO argument and practice that makes it inter-
esting for challenging and overcoming modern/colonial binaries in environmen-
tal activism explicitly builds on a critique of neocolonial/neoliberal 
structures of domination. Prominent Indian intellectual Vandana Shiva, for 
example, calls Western environmental science ‘masculine’, instrumental and 
exploitative (see .                         Shiva, 1989). Shiva makes a link between this understanding 
and the develop-mental and economic agenda advanced by multinational 
corporations (MNCs) and Western-led international organisations in relation to 
agriculture (see e.g. Shiva, Emani and Jafri, 1999). Shiva argues that this Western 
understanding should be replaced by an approach towards agriculture and 
development that draws on non-Western, Indigenous, nurturing ways of 
engaging with land and nature. As I will show in  Chapter 3 , agriculture is 
indeed a prime site for making visible what some scholars have called 
‘ontological incompatibility’ (Carro-Ripalda and Astier, 2014). This means that 
the modern understanding of what it means to be human, of how the human 
relates to the nonhuman, and what the general place of humans and 
nonhumans is in the cosmos (all of which is significant for doing agriculture) not 
only clashes with non-modern understandings, but is incomprehensible to the
latter (and vice versa).2   However, based on an analysis of the Indian 
controversy around Bt cotton, I will argue in  Chapter 3  that the continuous 
invocation of the ‘external’ (Western states, Western ways of doing agriculture, 
MNCs, international organisations) versus the ‘internal’ (traditional, Indig-
enous, democratic, local ways of doing agriculture) reinforces modern/colonial 
binaries at the same time as it challenges them. As the case of the Indian Bt 
cotton controversy manifests, the distinction that anti-GMO activists make 
between the ‘natural’ and the ‘unnatural’ does not only refer to the GMO as 
opposed to the ‘natural’ organism, but also to agriculture as a whole: the 
‘unnatural’ is linked to the industrial approach, which follows the ideas of the 
Green Revolution, whereas the ‘natural’ is embodied in the traditional, 
authentic, Indigenous approach. As I will argue, anti-GMO activists need to 
understand and challenge modernity/coloniality at a much deeper 
epistemological and ontological level; tracing it back to particular colonial and 
postcolonial trajectories. In the case of Indian agricul-ture, for example, activists 
need to understand how colonial approaches towards state and economic 
development that have wholesale swallowed colonial ontolo-gies and rationales 
make it very difficult – if not even impossible – to hark back to an ‘authentically’ 
different ontology and agricultural practice. As I will show in  Chapter 4 , the 
continuous upholding of the modern=bad/traditional =good binary also has 
profound implications for the activist attempt to join forces across diverse 
geographical, cultural and socioeconomic backgrounds – i.e. the attempt to make 
environmental protest  global  – which too easily leads to a reproduction of colo-
nial oppression through reading protest rationales, strategies and activist 
identities through one particular (modern) epistemic frame.
 In sum, this book studies the problem of modern/colonial binaries in rela-
tion to anti-GMO activism at altogether three sites: the site of science 
( Chap-ter 2 ), the site of India’s controversy around Bt cotton ( Chapter 3 ) and 
the site of global environmental protest ( Chapter 4 ). It does so by analysing 
the activists’ arguments and practices that we find at these sites, as well as 
by using certain conceptual and ontological resources to both understand 
and move beyond the taken-for-granted (colonial) ‘common sense’ of existing 
positions. The resources that I will use are in particular Bruno Latour’s (2004) 
attempt to overcome the modern society/nature binary by assembling 
humans and nonhumans in a new political collective, Sylvia Wynter’s (2003) 
foundational essay on coloniality, Gayatri C. Spivak’s (1988) famous 
questioning of the subaltern’s voice and her general take on power and 
representation, Gilles Deleuze’s non-binary meta-physics of transformation, 
and María Lugones’s decolonial approach. Some of what I have described 
above, particularly in relation to the Indian Bt cotton con-troversy, sounds 
close to a traditional  postcolonial approach, insofar that I ques-tion how 
colonialism has in itself created understandings of the ‘natural’, the 
‘traditional’ and the ‘authentic’ from which the ‘postcolonial’ is unable to 
get away. Relating this interrogation to the question of how to pursue a  
postcolonial environmentalism brings this book close to Bruce Braun’s work 
on conceptu-alisations of and activism around the temperate rainforest in 
British Columbia. In his seminal book  The Intemperate Rainforest: Nature, 
Culture and Power on Canada’s West Coast (2002) Braun aims ‘to strive towards a 
new set of concepts that might inform a radical environmentalism that is 
attuned . . . to the rela-tions of power and domination that infuse our 
environmental ideas and imagi-nations’, with particular attention being paid 
‘to the subjugated histories and buried epistemologies – often  colonial 
epistemologies – that are hidden by, or within, the terms and identities through 
which forest politic . . . is organized and understood’ (ibid., x; emphasis in 
original). However, in addition, the aim of my book is a  decolonial one. Indeed, I 
aim to use some of the mentioned conceptual and ontological resources to not 
just analyse the debates, but to pinpoint how the exclusion of non-modern 
ontologies and epistemologies that has become cemented in much anti-
GMO argument and practice has been central to the rise of the modern 
project as such. In other words, I aim to show how modernity and coloniality 
have to be understood as co-constituted (Quijano, 2007). 
 Due to its transitional nature (cf. Preface), the book does not substantially engage 
with non-modern bodies of thought and practice, as the decolonial 
approach encourages us to do. However, it aims to use previously mentioned 
conceptual and ontological resources in dialogue with anti-GMO rationales 
and arguments to open up space for  sensing the existence of ontological 
difference and incom-patibility. As I will show throughout the chapters to 
come, this will make the book in itself become a means of disrupting 
modern/colonial binaries. Finally, the book will attempt to provide practical 
suggestions for how to concretely move anti-GMO activism beyond modern/
colonial binaries. As the subsequent chap-ters and particularly the conclusion 
of this book will show, these suggestions are often (though not always) 
counter-intuitive to common environmentalist belief. 
For example, I will make a case for the need to respect the rights of GMOs for 
ontological self-definition, the need to let go of an ‘anti’-attitude at specific 
sites, and the need to understand and come to terms with the ‘unnatural’ 
monstrosity of nature. 
 Anti-GMO activism past and present 
 About 12 percent of arable land worldwide is currently cultivated with GM 
crops. In 2013, 27 countries used the technology of genetic engineering (GE) 
in their agricultural production, though most GMOs were grown in just five: the 
US, Bra-zil, Argentina, Canada and India (Macnaghten, Carro-Ripalda and Burity, 
2015: 8–9). Biotechnological research and its application had begun in the US 
in the 1970s and had been initially accompanied by US public concern. But this 
concern waned after scientists had managed to convince the US public that the 
risks were both ‘marginal and manageable’ if certain guidelines were followed 
(Torgersen et al., 2002: 35). By contrast, due to strong public opposition, the 
Western European market has remained virtually closed to GM-products until 
very recently (Schur-man and Munro, 2009: 156). Established NGOs such as 
Greenpeace and Friends of the Earth had taken up the fight against GM 
technology, as had more radical organisations and social movements such as 
‘Gendreck Weg!’ or ‘Earth First!’. 
 In the so-called Global South there has been a rapid growth in the planting 
and selling of GMOs in the last decade. In 2011 more land was cultivated with 
GMO crops in the Global South than in the Global North (Macnaghten, Carro-
Ripalda and Burity, 2015: 9). While the US, Canadian and Argentinian 
markets have become saturated, Brazil and India (as ‘late adopters’) have 
continued to expand (ibid.). However, both Brazil and India have also featured 
some of the strongest farmer-based anti-GMO movements in the world. In 
the late 1990s and early 2000s campaigns against transnational agribusiness 
in the Global South were coordinated by the People’s Global Action network, 
which included hundreds of Indian farmers and members of the Landless 
Movement of Brazil (Kousis, 2010: 230). While worries about safety have for a 
long time constituted the core of con-cerns in the Western world – particularly 
in Scandinavian and German-speaking countries, which became the stronghold 
of European anti-GMO activism in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Torgersen et 
al., 2002: 60) – campaigns in the Global South have been dominated by issues 
such as corporate control over seeds and the neoliberal context of the 
implementation of the technology (Kinchy, 2012: 14; cf. Schurman and Munro, 
2010: 57; Jasanoff, 2005: 38). 
 Although contemporary expressions of protest around agricultural 
biotechnol-ogy remain in many ways wedded to earlier arguments (Kinchy, 
2012: 14), more recently the rhetoric has globally shifted towards a suggested 
need to maintain the right to choose which way to farm, and the 
socioeconomic consequences that infringing on those rights might entail 
(ibid., 133; cf. Alessandrini, 2010: 9; Kou-sis, 2010: 236). In March 2014, for 
example, Brazi l  rendered a verdict against agricultural giant Monsanto 
banning the planting of GE maize in the state of Campeche on the grounds 
of protecting local Indigenous communities. Growing 
GMOs, it was argued, would go against ‘the local communities’ right to decide on 
what grows on their land’ (Dîaz Pérez, 2014). 
 The debate on rights is closely related to discussions about the possibility 
of the coexistence of GM- and other ‘natural’ or ‘organic’ products, and the 
potential danger of the former ‘contaminating’ the latter. In the European 
Communities (EC) the issue of coexistence was already debated in the 
mid-2000s and resulting regulations, as well as those that make the labelling of 
GM-products compulsory, have led to a considerable dying down of much 
anti-GMO sentiment (Jasanoff, 2005: 144–5). This went hand in hand with a 
significant recovery of the biotech industry in the late 2000s, when it was able 
to capitalise on the spike in global food prices in 2008 and a growing demand 
for biofuels due to increasing con-cerns about climate change (Schurman and 
Munro, 2010: xiv). In North America, by contrast, the lack of formal 
coexistence rules and the fact that the liability of ensuring that agricultural 
products remain GM-free lies on the shoulders of individual farmers have led 
to an increase in protests in the last decade (Kinchy, 2012: 130–1). This had led 
some researchers, such as Rachel Schurman and Wil-liam Munro (2010: 180–2), 
to argue that simple ‘pro’- and ‘anti’-GMO arguments have started to lose 
ground. However, resistance to ‘the GMO’, including calls for its ban or, at 
least, tight regulation continue to remain central to activism over 
agricultural biotechnology – exemplified by the neat division that is made 
between GMOs and ‘natural’ products, and expressed in the idea of ‘choice’ (cf. 
Ansems de Vries and Rosenow, 2015: 1122). 
 The ‘radical’ argument against science-based 
environmentalism 
 As the previous section has made clear, much of the GMO controversy in 
Europe has taken place around the question whether or not science has 
established that GMOs are ‘safe’ to plant and consume. This focus on science 
and scientific evi-dence is typical for Western, modern societies and it has 
long been questioned by critical theorists. Michel Foucault is one of the 
prominent thinkers coming to mind when reflecting on how the emergence 
of ‘true’ (scientific) knowledge is always interrelated with a particular 
constellation of political, social and eco-nomic power relations. Foucault 
deemed the human sciences such as psychology to be the decisive sites for 
the production of acceptable knowledge in modern societies – not because of 
their objective truthfulness, determined by some ‘inter-nal dynamic’ (cf. Fuller, 
2007: 3), but because they allow an existing set of power relations to function 
(Foucault, 1991: 27). 
 Drawing on this and similar accounts, many contemporary critical scholars 
interested in environmental politics caution us against arguments that rely 
on ‘hard science’ as the decisive site of veridiction, because these arguments 
mar-ginalise those voices that link the need for environmental protection to the 
need for a more radical economic and political restructuring of society. As some 
schol-ars (e.g. de Goede and Randalls, 2009; Swyngedouw, 2007) point out, 
radical political approaches (rightly) focus on problems that are internal to 
society, such 
as structural inequality and exploitation. By contrast, a science-based approach 
has a tendency to advocate technocratic regulatory solutions for environmental 
problems, as the latter are regarded as existing externally to the way contem-
porary society is structured. Here ‘nature’ is understood as a given object, the 
comprehension of which relies on technical, calculable knowledge, graspable 
with numerical evidence, eschewing the ‘political’ question about ‘what kinds of 
natures we wish to inhabit, what kinds of natures we wish to preserve, to make, 
or, if need be, to wipe off the surface of the planet’ (Swyngedouw, 2007: 23). 
For Eric Swyngedouw (ibid., 21) the debate over GMOs shows particularly well 
how one particular kind of ‘Nature’ (the one that can be ‘packaged, numbered, 
calcu-lated, coded, modelled, and represented’) has become hegemonic, and is 
used by technocrats, scientists as well as environmental activists to ultimately 
(possibly unintentionally) fend off more fundamental challenges to our world. 
What under-lies Swyngedouw’s critique is an understanding of ‘politics’ as the 
struggle of different visions about how to structure society as a whole, while 
‘post-politics’ makes political procedure a consensual exercise that erases any 
notion of funda-mental struggle (cf. Rancière, 1999, 2010; Žižek, 1999). 
 Others argue that scientific evidence allows neoliberal ideologies an ever-
tighter grip on contemporary societies. Inspired by Foucault’s notion of 
‘biopolitics’, which Foucault uses to describe the intimate relationship between 
the governance of populations and the knowledge about their presumably 
‘natural’ processes that is available to those in power, it is maintained that 
neoliberal regimes make use of knowledge to be found in e.g. systems ecology. 
Based on this knowledge, neo-liberals, the argument goes, make a case for the 
benefits of self-regulation and the becoming ‘resilient’ of socio-ecological 
systems (see e.g. Walker and Cooper, 2011). Emphasising the ‘complexity’ of 
these systems, neoliberal theorists and policy-makers supposedly maintain that 
the idea of controlling socio-ecological systems needs to be replaced with a 
focus on adaptation, so that external catas-trophes such as climate change or 
terrorism can be survived. Elaborating on this logic, Julian Reid (2012: 69) 
argues that environmentalists consequently need to give up the idea of 
‘ecological reasoning’ as means of political contestation. Instead they need to 
recognise that the decisive problem of our time is not that there is insufficient 
concern for the vulnerability of the natural world in main-stream policy-
making. Indeed, there is rather too much: neoliberal governance today is, 
Reid (ibid.) suggests, all about our vulnerability to nature and other external 
forces (cf. Chandler, 2012; Evans and Reid, 2013, 2014). Instead of mis-
recognising how ecological systems work, Reid (2012: 68–9, 77) maintains that 
contemporary neoliberal governmentality has understood this far too well: it 
has made it part and parcel of the neoliberal logic of self-reliance and 
responsibility. 
 All of these analyses and arguments allow for insight into the problems 
that occur when ‘science’ is invoked in order to make a case for political 
action on behalf of some diffuse entity called ‘Nature’ or ‘Ecology’. 
Particularly the critique of the post-political also rightly emphasises the need 
to listen to mar-ginalised voices that connect environmentalism to a politics 
that aims to chal-lenge structures of injustice at a deeper level. However, I 
am concerned about 
the extent to which critique in these approaches remains wedded to what Walter 
D. Mignolo, drawing on Aníbal Quijano, has called the coloniality of knowledge 
(Mignolo, 2007: 451; cf. Quijano, 2007). The theoretical framework that is used 
remains an intra-modern one that is sitting, unchallengeable, on top of the 
critique that is made. Indeed, both the notion of ‘post-politics’ and the 
notion of ‘bio-politics’ have been elevated to the status of ‘fixed’ theoretical 
schemata against which existing political practices (such as environmentalist 
ones) are judged in a binary manner (cf. Coleman and Hughes, 2015: 142; 
Coleman and Rosenow, 2017a). The ‘true’ problem that needs to be tackled, the 
argument goes, is either the socioeconomic structure of Western societies, or 
global neoliberal biopolitics, both of which being exclusively analysed through 
the lens of given (European) categories and concepts. In those conceptions 
‘nature’ as something ‘out there’ is nothing but a construction, a discourse that 
serves capitalist, neoliberal elites. The implications of this are particularly stark 
when David Chandler and Julian Reid (forthcoming) use their understanding of 
the nature of contemporary neoliberal governmentality to explicitly criticise 
the call for challenging modern/colonial epistemologies and for turning to 
‘outside’ ontologies such as the ones found in Indigenous thought and practice. 
Instead of seeing those arguments as radical or emancipatory, we should, 
Chandler and Reid maintain, see them as extending ‘dominant western 
hegemonic practices’ (i.e. neoliberal governmentality) (ibid.; emphasis added). 
Though we should stand in ‘political solidarity’ with Indig-enous struggle e.g. 
against the ‘repossession of the lands of which it has been robbed’, any 
attempt to use Indigenous knowledge in order to understand ‘politics and 
ontology’ anew ‘through a way of being’ leads us into celebrating ‘defeat’ 
rather than ‘resistance’ (ibid.). Here we can precisely see the problem of a ‘radi-
cal’ scholarship that affirms socioeconomic (decolonial) struggles, but fails to 
come to terms with the epistemological and ontological dimension of coloniality. 
The decisive problems of our world are solely grasped through the lens of given 
(Eurocentric) concepts, while Indigenous cosmologies are reduced to mere ‘dis-
courses’ that are appropriated by dominant governmental regimes and logics. 
The eye of the critic remains firmly fixed on the coloniser and what He does, 
with no scope left for ‘outside’ knowledge to regain any sort of agency.  3 
 The coloniality of knowledge remains unchallenged.
 Moving beyond modern/colonial binaries? The New 
Materialisms and Latour’s politics of the collective 
 Compared to the arguments that I have outlined and challenged in the previous 
section, the critical tradition of the so-called New Materialisms could be con-
sidered as having a natural affinity with the decolonial project of overcoming 
the coloniality of knowledge. This is because it explicitly engages in ontological re-
imagination in order to critique and potentially overcome modern conceptions of 
nature, matter, agency and politics. Admittedly the label ‘New Materialisms’ is in 
many ways misleading because it tends to conceal the fundamental disagree-ments 
between the scholars who are grouped together in its name. Here, I use the 
label as it is employed and explained by Diana Coole and Samantha Frost in their 
edited volume  New Materialisms  (2010b), and in relation to the scholars who have 
contributed to that volume. Many of the latter share an interest in developing 
dif-ferent understandings of materiality in order to fundamentally challenge 
modern philosophical frames.  4   Even more importantly, there are quite a few 
similarities between the ‘new’ ontologies outlined by those scholars and the 
understandings of those anti-GMO activists who draw on complexity theory in 
order to make their case against the technology of genetic engineering (GE) (cf. 
Braun, 2015). 
 According to Coole and Frost (2010a) New Materialists attempt to altogether 
break with binary understandings of the world. Individual entities (human as 
well as nonhuman) are regarded as fundamentally interconnected and (thereby) 
unable to hold fixed, contained identities. For William Connolly, for example, the 
world is one of ‘abundance’ in which individuals are ‘not exhausted’ by their 
identity, but relate to wider ‘force-fields’ on which they emerge, fracture and 
(re-)connect (Connolly, 2002: 120, 2011: 5). The force-fields that condition 
different identi-ties are fundamentally non-binary, and any identity emerging 
from them is never sufficiently ‘finished’ to be constituted in opposition to 
something else. In line with this, any interpretation of reality, of its truth and of 
its problems, is always exceeded by the ontology it tries to capture, which 
disrupts any sense of certainty about oneself, the world and the problems that 
we face. It disrupts any sense of ‘attunement, explanation, prediction, mastery, 
or control’ (Connolly, 2011: 5; cf. White, 2000: 114). All of what is usually 
assumed to be binary becomes part of a non-binary, vibrant, agentic process of 
materialisation. Politically this should encourage us, as Connolly argues in his 
latest work which is particularly con-cerned with the problem climate 
change, to form ‘a new pluralist assemblage organized by multiple minorities 
drawn from different regions, classes, creeds, age cohorts, sexualities, and 
states’; engaging in a ‘politics of swarming’ that is ‘activated by the power of 
planetary forces’ (Connolly, 2017: 8–9). 
 However, if agency is everywhere and if materiality is vibrant, it becomes dif-
ficult to recognise an actual  lack  of it on the side of those who are powerless 
and oppressed. ‘Lack’ points to a fundamental negativity that is difficult to 
integrate into an ontology of ‘abundance’. If ‘structures’ are replaced with 
‘networks’ (as happening for example in Actor-Network-Theory (ANT)), ‘all 
parties are pre-sented as exerting their own kind of power over each other, 
according to alli-ances they can form in a given circumstance’ (Fuller, 2010: 11). 
In other words, everything seems to be constantly in flux and open for new 
events and alliances to take shape. It is often critiqued that New Materialist 
ontologies occlude how the interrelation of (material) identities is impacted 
on by particular historical ‘power geometries’ that have led (and continue to 
lead) to agents being ‘affected’ differently (Tolia-Kelly, 2006: 213–14). In other 
words, structural inequalities and oppression (in their historical and 
contemporary manifestations) have had an impact on how different agents are 
affected and how they connect – or indeed fail to do so (ibid.; cf. Ansems de 
Vries and Rosenow, 2015: 1120). As Gayatri C. Spivak (1988) poignantly argues in 
her famous essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak’, the problem of dismissing 
representation is that it erases any possibility to reflect 
on differentiated positions, and on the fact that people, for historical and geopo-
litical reasons, have differentiated capacities to act and speak. Pulling everyone 
and everything together as emerging from some infinite force-field harbours the 
danger of not being able to interrogate how particular identities emerge as dif-
ferentiated, shaped by particular sedimented historical (colonial) legacies. Even if 
the injustices of colonial and neoliberal capitalist exploitation are acknowledged 
and analysed, as in Connolly’s case (see e.g. Connolly, 2008), the call for a ‘poli-
tics of swarming’ that ‘is composed of multiple constituencies, regions, levels, 
processes of communication, and modes of action’ (Connolly, 2017: 125) makes it 
difficult to reflect on varying distributions of affect and connectivity  within  the 
assemblage. What are the internal hierarchies and structurally differentiated posi-
tions, what do they tell us about past and contemporary domination, and what 
are, as result, the specific responsibilities of those participating in the 
assemblage?  5  
 As this book will show in relation to biotechnology, much of conventional sci-
ence (in practice and theory), still heavily relies on Cartesian subject-object or 
mind-matter dualisms: in the process of scientific investigation, the truth of the 
object is revealed to the scientist as subject, contributing to scientific progress 
and delineating a world in which those who have minds are agents, and in which 
matter stays passive and predictable. In other words, GMOs are precisely  not 
regarded as agents that exercise an (not entirely predictable) ‘force’ (cf. Barry, 
2013: 2; Whatmore, 2009: 588; Whatmore, 2002), but as objects that are control-
lable by the human agents who have modified them. By contrast, for Isabelle 
Stengers, GMOs are nonhuman agents that are brought into the political realm 
by humans (e.g. anti-GMO activists) who act as their ‘spokespersons’ and who 
thereby make the organisms’ ‘presence felt’ (Stengers, 2010: 20).  6   It is argued 
that this human-nonhuman-assemblage leads to an extension of debates about 
exper-tise, a questioning of the limits of knowledge and a contestation over what 
GMOs really are: objects of progress that are under control, or (for example) 
‘vehicles for intellectual property rights’ that illustrate ‘capitalist expropriation 
strateg[ies]’? (ibid., 21) However, Stengers also deliberately takes the 
‘oppositional connota-tion’ out of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the 
‘minoritarian’, and puts it into a context of ‘together-ness’, where people and 
things are ‘attached’ and ‘associated’ in heterogeneity (ibid., 14). They then have 
the ‘capacity . . . to band together and act in concert but in the manner of a 
“swarm” rather than in consequence of some pre-figured category of political 
interest . . . or class’ (Whatmore, 2009: 592). But isn’t it precisely the oppositional 
nature of the concept of the ‘minoritarian’ – or of a concept such as ‘class’ – that 
makes it politically powerful, able to disturb the given social and political order by 
pointing at fundamental structures of oppres-sion and injustice? 
 As I will show in the following, this problem is at least partly addressed in 
the work of what Graham Harman (2014) calls the ‘middle Latour’. For Latour, 
the binary between ‘nature’ and ‘society’ is decisive for the organisation of 
modern life: it has developed, he (2004: 3) suggests, ‘over centuries in such a 
way as to make any juxtaposition, any synthesis, any combination of the two 
terms impossible’, and it stabilises all other traditional modern dichotomies: man/
nature, subject/object, mind/matter, etc. With regard to the political 
implica-tions of his work, Latour has moved, Harman (ibid.) suggests, through 
different phases. In his early work, Latour is most inspired by the political 
philosophies of Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli, though he replaces 
the struggle between  human power players that we find in both with the struggle 
of  human 
and nonhuman ‘actants’ the agency of which is solely measured in line with the 
effect that they are able to generate. Latour’s early work is characterised by a ‘ 
“symmetrical” ontology’ in which actants are seeking allies to connect to in 
order to establish hegemony (ibid., 51). ‘[M]ight’ trumps ‘right’ (ibid., 13), with 
‘no court of appeal beyond winning or losing’ (ibid., 46). By contrast, the ‘mid-
dle Latour’ replaces this power struggle with a ‘carefully assembled institutional 
network’ (ibid., 56). Particularly in his book  Politics of Nature: How to Bring the 
Sciences into Democracy (2004), Latour argues that we need to create a ‘new 
Constitution’ and set up a new ‘collective’ that very well serves as a ‘court of 
appeal’ for the various propositions that plea for inclusion. He explicitly attempts 
to establish a practical ‘procedure’ for making things ‘right’, one that 
leaves behind the ‘old’, modern, binary Constitution. It is for that reason that 
this part of his work will be one of the crucial conceptual resources that will 
be used in this book. 
 In  Politics of Nature  Latour uses the metaphor of the ‘house’ to describe the 
make-up of what he calls the ‘old [modern] Constitution’: the  social  house is 
the place of humans, who can communicate via speech but ‘find themselves in 
chains’, ignorant of the world and its real mechanisms (ibid., 13). The house of  
nature , by contrast, is inhabited by ‘nonhumans’ that are governed by objective 
laws but unable to communicate (ibid., 13–14). Because the truth of reality is 
solely located in the second house, it is regarded as having the authority to ‘tell 
the truth without being challenged, put an end to the interminable arguments [of 
the first house] through an incontestable form of authority that would stem 
from things themselves’ (ibid., 14). This truth is communicated to the social 
house by ‘travellers’, who ‘can make the mute world speak’ (ibid.). Importantly, 
these travellers – the scientists – are the only ones who ‘can go back and forth 
from one world to the other no matter what’; the only ones who have been able 
to escape the ‘tyranny of the social dimension, public life, politics, subjective 
feelings, popular agitation’ (ibid., 10). 
 Latour argues that the only solution to this problem is to get rid of the houses 
altogether, and to develop a new Constitution that allows for establishing  one 
collective. Importantly, for Latour, constructivist critical approaches to reality 
(including, I argue, much of the Foucauldian discourse-focused approaches that I 
have previously critiqued) aims to cut off any ties between the natural and the 
social, closing the door for  any  travellers instead of throwing it wide open for 
everyone to go through. Constructivist approaches rigidify the binary between 
the natural and the social by leaving ‘nature’ to the scientists alone and by 
aiming for a rule of the social that is solely determined by social mechanisms and 
discourses, understood only by those who engage these mechanisms and 
discourses in theory and practice. In Latour’s words (ibid., 33), 
 the idea that “nature does not exist”, since it is a matter of “social 
construc-tion”, only reinforces the division between the Cave and Heaven 
of Ideas by superimposing this division onto the one that distinguishes 
the human sci-ences from the natural sciences. 
As Connolly (2017: 10) puts it in a related critique of what he calls 
'sociocentrism’, it is falsely assumed that ‘cultural interpretation and social 
explanation can proceed without consulting deeply nonhuman, planetary 
forces with degrees of autonomy of their own.’ 
 Instead, Latour aims to bring down the existence of the houses altogether, by 
giving external (natural) reality a (new) place in the work of the collective (ibid., 
10). Rather than questioning the very existence of ‘objective external reality’, as 
the constructivists do, we should argue for the existence of  more  reality – a 
reality, however, that is never ‘definitive’. Not because we do not yet know 
enough about it, but because it is ever-changing, depending on what human 
associates with what nonhuman at one particular moment in time. On the side 
of nature (as on the side of the social) we have ‘countless imbroglios’ that 
always already presuppose human participation (in the way nature is made 
sense of, for example, in labora-tory experiments, in observation, in sampling 
etc.) (ibid., 20). For Latour (ibid., 89), the new collective should consequently 
be understood as ‘an ever-growing list of associations between humans and 
nonhuman actors’. This does not mean (and this is important, particularly 
regarding my previous critique of the New Materialist literature) that we 
should consequently strive for an indefinite open-ness towards embracing 
ever-new actors and human-nonhuman-associations. What we have to be 
open for, Latour maintains, are the  claims  for inclusion that are made by new 
associations that ‘find themselves mobilized, recruited, social-ized, 
domesticated’ (ibid., 38), claims that the collective has to deliberate, but 
might well decide to turn down. 
 What the collective needs is an ‘explicit procedure’ in which decisions about 
collectivity, unity and in- or exclusion can be made together (ibid., 41). What it 
cannot do is simply ‘adding together . . . nature and society’ (ibid., 57). 
Everything needs to be thrown into the air and reassembled anew – which is 
a very slow process. Indeed, one of Latour’s key messages in  Politics of Nature  
is the need to slow things down, and to properly recognise everyone’s right to 
fight for her/his/its own conception of ‘the good common world’: ‘Nothing and 
no one must come in to simplify, shorten, limit, or reduce the scope of this 
debate in advance’ (ibid., 130) – neither by asserting that the facts have been 
(scientifically) established, nor by asserting that nonhumans (and their scientific 
spokespersons) have to be excluded altogether.
 However, despite creating space for the provision of ‘right’ over ‘might’ in a con-
crete political procedure, Latour is still unable to solve the problem of 
coloniality. Indeed, although Latour himself remarks at one point that the 
two-house logic is a specifically modern one in which ‘[n]on-Western cultures’ 
have never been interested (ibid., 43), this argument remains at the level of 
statement: it is not accompanied by any analysis of how and why this logic had 
become dominant (in 
other words, it is not accompanied by an analysis, or even an acknowledgement 
of the need for an analysis of colonial exploitation). The politics of the collective 
remains an ideal scenario that is detached from any actual history of injustice 
and exploitation, or any concrete configurations of power. Falling once again 
prey to binary thinking, Latour opposes the  new  to the  old , the  ideal  to grim  
reality . In the ideal scenario, decisions about inclusion or exclusion of 
particular propositions are justified if they follow ‘due process’ (ibid., 91). Does 
this mean, in practice, that propositions about, say, the need for reparations 
for past colonial exploita-tion can be excluded from public life if the 
deliberation of that proposition has been sufficiently ‘slow’? Latour (ibid., 117) 
emphasises that the collective needs to recognise everyone’s right to fight for 
the sort of collective world and life s/he/it desires, and that controversies 
should not be solved too quickly. At the end of the process of deliberation, the 
collective divides the world into ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’, and without that 
element of ‘closure’ it would not ‘be able to learn’ (ibid., 146). But all learning, 
reflection, judgement and decision-making remains internal to the collective, 
and though particular propositions themselves can point to questions of history, 
power and inequality, in theory the collective is still free to disregard history, 
exclude claims related to it and label them as ‘enemies’. Of course the inability 
to judge from the outside is exactly what Latour thinks is desirable, and it is 
in line with my previous critique of those strands of critical scholarship that 
judge actually-existing political struggles against given theoreti-cal schemata. 
However, as Harman (2014) well puts it, Latour’s commitment to this sort of 
immanence ‘verges on a commitment to victory’ that is not interested in seeking 
justice for the ‘losers of history’ (ibid., 13–14). This is intolerable from a 
decolonial position, as it fails to recognise how modernity could only come 
about through being co-constituted with coloniality.  7  
 In order to tackle this problem I want to argue that Latour’s perspective needs 
to be complemented with a decolonial one, which, in contrast to the former, 
takes the existence of historical, differentiated structures of injustice and 
oppression as a starting-point for the critique of modern (binary) thought and 
for the devel-opment of alternatives. In other words, from a decolonial 
perspective questions of ontology are grounded in a (primary) analysis of 
history, though, as the next section will show, the latter inevitably points at the 
need for basing strategies of transformation in alternative ‘outside’ ontologies. 
 Starting from historical oppression: the problem 
of colonial difference 
 For decolonial scholars the colonial project has to be understood as co-
constitutive of the project of modernity as such. Drawing on the philosophy of 
Enrique Dus-sel, Quijano introduced the term ‘coloniality of power’ in his 1989 
foundational text (which was translated and published in English in 2007) in 
contrast to the term ‘colonialism’ that is meant to describe ‘an explicit 
[historical] political order’ (Quijano, 2007: 170). The concept of coloniality 
signifies the ‘extension of Western capitalism’ and the parallel ‘extension of 
Western epistemology’ to the 
non-European world, having started in the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries with 
the conquering of the Americas and ‘the emergence of the Atlantic commercial 
cir-cuit’ (Mignolo, 2002: 58–9). Importantly, it is continuing to the present day 
as ‘the most general form of domination in the world’ (Quijano, 2007: 170). 
Because of the process of co-constitution, the beginning of modernity ‘proper’ 
likewise needs to be located in the fifteenth/sixteenth centuries and not, as it is 
often done, in the eighteenth century. Otherwise ‘coloniality’ becomes merely 
‘derivative’; serving to reaffirm modernity’s claim to be all-inclusive and 
universal, erasing or relegat-ing the ‘Iberian foundational period of capitalist 
expansion and coloniality . . . to the Middle Ages as the Black Legend’ (Mignolo, 
2002: 61). 
 Because of the crucial epistemological dimension of the modernity/coloniality 
project, decolonisation needs to include decolonising knowledge, which for 
Mignolo (2007) needs to happen through an epistemic ‘de-linking’ of the 
Global South.  8  For this argument Mignolo draws on Latin American dependency 
theory, which he defines as ‘a political statement for . . . social transformation  of 
and from Third World countries ’ (in contrast to world-system analysis which 
Mignolo uses as well, but which he defines as ‘a political statement for 
academic transformation  from First World countries’ ) (Mignolo, 2002: 63; 
emphasis added). The decolo-nising task lies in a move towards ‘the re-
construction and restitution of silenced histories, repressed subjectivities, 
subalternized knowledges and languages per-formed by the Totality depicted 
under the names of modernity and rationality.’ (Mignolo, 2007: 451) 
 In short, for decolonial scholars we need different, non-Western (‘de-linked’) 
epistemologies that are able to go beyond modern (binary) categorisation 
because of the actual, historical (colonial) forms of oppression that have 
brought about the latter. This is what makes their argument relevant for the 
purposes of this book. In order to move beyond modern/colonial binaries in 
environmental activism, it is not enough to think beyond modernity  from within 
the inside of European moder-nity itself . In other words, it is not enough to 
engage in ‘intra-modern’ (Escobar, 2007: 180) or ‘Eurocentric’ critique (Dussel, 
cited in Mignolo, 2002: 57). Instead, new thought has to emerge from the  other  
side of what Mignolo calls the ‘colonial difference’, which is the ‘difference 
between center and periphery, between the Eurocentric critique of 
Eurocentrism and knowledge production by those who participated in 
building the modern/colonial world and those who have been left out of the 
discussion’ (ibid., 63). To paraphrase Gurminder K. Bhambra (2014: 130), 
rather than an endogenous understanding of the development of European 
modernity, Europe should have an exogenous one that acknowledges how it has 
evolved from the oppression of ‘other cultures [that] constitute the ground 
of European self-realization’. 
 Besides decolonising knowledge, we also need to decolonise Being – which 
brings us back to the realm of  ontology . The term ‘coloniality of Being’ was ini-
tially used by Mignolo and then taken up and further developed, as a 
concept, by Nelson Maldonado-Torres (2007). While ‘coloniality of power’ refers 
to ‘the interrelation among modern forms of exploitation and domination 
(power)’, and ‘coloniality of knowledge’ to colonial modes of knowledge 
production as 
previously outlined, ‘coloniality of being’ is about ‘the lived experience of colo-
niality’ of those who have been subjected to it (ibid., 242). Drawing among 
others on Emmanuel Lévinas, Maldonado-Torres critically interrogates the 
exclusionary dimension of ontological thinking as a ‘philosophy of power’ when 
it is taken ‘as foundation or ultimate end’. Critiquing Heidegger, Lévinas argues 
that the prob-lem of a focus on ontology is that it ‘gives priority to an 
anonymous Being over and beyond the [ethical] self-Other relation’. 
Consequently, as seen in Heidegger, the yearning becomes one for 
‘authenticity’ rather than ‘radical responsibility’ (cited in ibid., 258). 
 Due to understanding being (matter) as always exceeding any capture, and as 
disrupting any sense of coherence or identity, which, it could be argued, leads to 
an  extension  of responsibility towards the Other rather than a neglect, this 
cri-tique does not fully apply to New Materialists. As Mario Blaser (2013: 551) 
has pointed out, the ‘foundational’ (and thereby exclusionary) claim of ontology 
can be avoided if we go beyond  both  a notion of ontology as a mere heuristic 
device,  and  as the making of a foundational claim. Rather, Blaser (ibid.) argues, 
we should regard it as a ‘heuristic device’ that contributes to ‘enact[ing] the 
“fact”, which allows us ‘to articulate a foundationless foundational claim.’ In 
other words, we do stick to the idea of there being a ‘reality out there’, but, 
similarly to the New Materialists (on whom Blaser indeed draws as well; ibid.), 
we do not regard this ‘reality’ as ever graspable with one definite set of 
concepts or categories. Ontol-ogy then becomes ‘a way of worlding, a form of 
enacting’ a reality that never-theless, in some sense,  is  – but as ‘always in the 
making through the dynamic relations of hybrid assemblages’ (ibid., 551–2). 
Because this involves, for Blaser, ‘a certain political sensibility’ that contains 
some normative commitment to enact reality as a ‘pluriverse’, Blaser (ibid., 552) 
calls this  political ontology  (see  Chap-ter 2 for more details). 
 However, taken on its own, this still does not get us away from the 
question whether  some  ‘enactments’ of ontology should be prioritised over  
others . In other words, before we move to the  pluriverse , we need to come to 
terms with the colo-nial difference that has led to the dominance of the 
(modern)  universe  in the first place. Coming back to Maldonado-Torres’s 
Lévinasian question about ‘radical responsibility’, what the New Materialist 
approach does not offer is the ability to reflect on  concrete  responsibility 
towards  concrete  others, resulting from the analysis of a  concrete  history of 
oppression and annihilation. This is precisely why we need the decolonial 
approach: it asks for what Mignolo (2002: 63) calls a ‘re-construction and 
restitution’ of the knowledge and, indeed, ‘being’ (as lived experience) of those 
who have been silenced. This does not mean that there is something 
ontologically ‘original’ that needs to be restored (like an original pre-colonial 
ontology) (Escobar, 2007: 186). Instead, decoloniality functions as ‘an 
invitation to think modernity/coloniality critically from different epistemic posi-
tions and according to the manifold experiences of subjects who suffer different 
dimensions of the coloniality of Being.’ (Maldonado-Torres, 2007: 261) 
 Mignolo (2007: 452) is keen to distinguish the  de-  from the  postcolonial  
critique by emphasising the more fundamental ‘fracture’ that the former 
introduces 
into a Eurocentred modernity. For Mignolo (ibid.), postcolonial theorists remain 
too wedded to European thought (particularly European postmodern 
perspectives) and are insufficiently radical when it comes to the need for 
transformation beyond the academy and the realm of culture. However, 
though there has so far been little attempt to bring them together, both 
perspectives are not mutually exclusive (Bhambra, 2014: 119). As I will show in 
this book (particularly in  Chapter 3 ) a postcolonial perspective is able to tackle 
the latent assumption in some decolo-nial work that social movements from 
the Global South think and act from the ‘outside’ qua definition. This is related 
to the problem that foundational decolo-nial texts often base their core 
arguments in a rather sweeping, ‘easy’ historical and geopolitical account in 
which a clear (geographical) demarcation is made between the ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’ of modernity, at least when it comes to practi-cal examples (decolonial 
scholars are more successful in avoiding this problem in their conceptual work). 
As Julia Suárez-Krabbe (2016: 17–18) has pointed out, a related problem is that 
decolonial scholars take their own (scholarly and activ-ist) work as coming from a 
position of subalternity simply by the fact that they are located or have roots in 
the ‘South’, without further reflection on how Latin American ‘elites’ (including 
scholarly elites) have been constituted as part of the continent’s own, complex 
colonial trajectory. We might need the ‘pessimism’ of postcolonial scholars, who 
are often more critical in relation to what is going on in social movements in the 
Global South itself, in order to counter the sometimes overly euphoric, liberation-
affirming ‘optimism’ of the decolonial critique.  9  
 In line with a more postcolonial approach, this book continues to engage the 
concepts and epistemologies of European thinkers: in particular, as already men-
tioned, the thought of Bruno Latour, but also the philosophy of Gilles Deleuze. 
Like Latour, Deleuze is guilty of not linking the problems of modernity as well as 
his (alternative) metaphysics of non-binary transformation explicitly to the proj-
ect of coloniality, and of once again pursuing the development of philosophical 
alternatives utterly unrelated to actually-existing ‘other’ philosophies. In order to 
avoid the reproduction of the coloniality of knowledge as much as possible while 
still drawing on these two thinkers, I will only consider Latour and Deleuze to 
the extent that their ontologies, epistemologies, concepts and methodologies are 
supporting thought and practice from the ‘outside’ of modernity, which will be 
established by bringing them into dialogue with the de- and postcolonial thought 
of Sylvia Wynter, Gayatri C. Spivak and María Lugones, as well as anti-GMO 
argument and activist at both European and non-European sites. Out of all this 
will emerge different, decolonised ways of understanding nature, nonhumans, 
humans, the sciences, ‘voices’ and (global) political activism – moving through 
and then beyond modern/colonial binaries. 
 Chapter outline 
 In  Chapter 2  I will analyse the arguments of anti-GMO advocates at the site of sci-
ence itself. I will show how the activists’ drawing on complexity science in order 
to reject the technology of GE has the potential of challenging modern/colonial 
binaries more generally, by questioning the central modern distinctions between 
subject and object, mind and matter, human and nonhuman. However, I will also 
argue that relying on science does not take us far enough in our attempt to over-
come modernity/coloniality, because even those advocating alternative 
scientific approaches continue to regard science as the privileged site of 
providing informa-tion about the objective ‘truth’ of nature. This leaves the 
crucial nature/society dichotomy intact. In order to address this problem, I will 
transform some of the claims made by anti-GMO activists, as well as the claims 
made by their opponents, into what Latour (2004) calls  propositions . 
Propositions, contra to facts, arise out of particular human-nonhuman-
associations. They make a claim for inclusion into the  collective , with the latter 
deliberating these claims in ‘due process’ (ibid., 91) without short-cutting 
discussions by referring to facts. Analysing the claims of five propositions – 
‘survival machine’ (proposition 1), ‘sea abyss descendants’ (proposition 2), 
‘emergent relationality’ (proposition 3), ‘controllable possession’ (proposition 4) 
and ‘dancing whole’ (proposition 5), I will outline the ‘ontological 
conflict’ (Blaser, 2013: 548) that is taking place among them: some propositions 
affirm modern/colonial binaries, others are able to move away from them at 
least to a certain extent. Drawing on Blaser’s concept of political ontology, I will 
show that using the procedure of Latour’s collective in this way is already in 
itself a means of contesting the universalist claims of modern/colonial 
(binary) ontol-ogy, by ‘shrinking’ the latter and making it just one particular 
ontological ‘enact-ment’ among others (ibid., 553). This particular ‘method’ puts 
my chapter in line with the general thrust of decolonial critique and ethos. 
Moreover, concerns over coloniality enter the ‘story’ (ibid., 552) of the 
collective in this chapter through the introduction of various ‘witnesses’ and 
‘spokespersons’ that speak on behalf, or against, various propositions; shedding 
light, for example, on the coloniality of proposition 1 ‘survival machine’ (which is 
based on Richard Dawkins’s claim about the gene as ‘selfish’ and the organism as 
a ‘survival machine’; cf.  Chapter 2 ). All of this will lead me in the end to affirm, 
from a decolonial position, those propositions that more fundamentally 
question modern/colonial binaries, such as proposition 5 ‘dancing whole’ (which 
depicts the organism as a self-coordinated dance that cannot be fully 
understood, let alone controlled). However, further drawing on Latour’s 
concept of the spokesperson, I will also argue that in order to fully decolonise 
science-based anti-GMO arguments, activists need to give up the idea of being 
able to ‘truthfully’ represent nature as one harmonious entity. Instead, as I will 
show based on a concrete example, they need to start measuring the 
‘faithfulness’ of their own testimony by looking at the extent to which nonhu-
mans are able to resist and transform the questions activists ask of them.
  Chapter 3  will engage with the anti-GMO argument that agricultural 
biotech-nology is yet another means used by MNCs, international organisations 
and West-ern states to push through their neocolonial and neoliberal agenda. 
Taking the controversy around Bt cotton in India as example, I will analyse the 
binary logic that underlies the argument of prominent environmentalist 
Vandana Shiva, who distinguishes between the modern, neoliberal, neocolonial 
way of doing agricul-ture on the one hand, and a traditional, authentic, 
Indigenous way on the other. 
The same logic is found, as I will show, in the argument of Shiva’s principal oppo-
nent, Ronald J. Herring, who understands Bt-adopting farmers as rational agents 
making decisions about what to plant on the basis of ‘what works’. I will argue 
that both sets of argument neglect to what extent the actual ‘voices’ of farmers 
are shaped by particular historical-colonial conditions – not just 
socioeconomically, but also at a deeper, onto-epistemological level. Drawing 
on Spivak’s famous essay ‘Can the Subaltern Speak?’ (1988) and bringing the 
latter’s take on repre-sentation into conversation with Latour’s understanding 
of spokespersonship, I will develop a new understanding of how to give an 
adequate ‘voice’ to both sub-altern humans  and  nonhumans that are involved 
in the Bt cotton controversy. This will be fleshed out further with the help of 
Deleuze, particularly his concept of the ‘statement’ (Deleuze, 1999) and of the 
notion of ‘regimes of signs’ that Deleuze developed together with Guattari 
(Deleuze and Guattari, 2004). Deleuze, I argue, enables us to move towards an 
alternative understanding of reality that can only be accessed through  sense , 
rather than through a narrow focus on and rational pro-cessing of what is 
actually ‘said’ or ‘done’. Based on the example of the Bt con-troversy, I will 
argue that we need to develop new ‘statements’ about GMOs and 
environmental protest. These ‘statements’ emerge, on the one hand, out of 
having to endure the  silence  that we find in relation to alternative onto- 
epistemologies, a silence that is related to India’s particular postcolonial history 
that, in relation to the role of science, progress and political economy, has 
emerged out of  continuity  with its colonial history. On the other hand, new 
‘statements’ also arise out of the ‘noise’ of Indian anti-GMO activism. As I will 
show, GMOs have become part of particular historical-social-natural-economic 
assemblages that have rendered unfamiliar those objects that neoliberal 
forces of globalisation have previously (successfully) rendered too familiar to 
contest. However, I will also critique the ongoing activist fixation on the 
ontological properties of GMOs as intrinsically ‘dangerous’, the continuing 
strong reliance on scientific ‘facts’, and the affirma-tion of an (imagined) 
traditional, familiar, authentic identity that risks cutting down the human-
nonhuman-assemblage to a form that once again correlates with what I will call 
the modern/colonial apparatus of Man/gene/State. 
  Chapter 4  is interested in the connections that anti-GMO activists from 
various political, geographical, socioeconomic and cultural backgrounds make 
with each other in order to transform their protest into a ‘global’ one. In 
order to achieve this activists tend to focus on the shared desire for global 
justice, the rejection of neoliberalism and the opposition to the global strategies 
of agrobusiness. The academy often understands the spatiality of ‘global’ 
resistance as being either one of networked connection, or of protest taking 
place within specific, locally bounded spaces that are purposefully designed as 
‘living the change’ for which activists fight (see for example the Occupy 
protests). I will use Lugones’s (2003) work in order to disrupt and decolonise 
these spatial imaginaries, drawing on her understanding of resistance as having 
to take place from the site of the multiple, ‘impure’, ‘world’-travelling self 
against oppressions that need to be understood as enmeshed. Based on that 
approach, I will critique the coloniality of one particular historical example of 
global protest: the 1999 Intercontinental Caravan (ICC) with 
which several hundred Indian farmers and other non-Western activists travelled 
around Europe together with European activists in order to protest at the sites of 
international organisations and corporations. The coloniality of this protest mani-
fests itself, I argue, in the way that activists seek harmony and ‘sameness’ among 
themselves with regard to their identity, objectives and overall strategies, as well 
as (relatedly) the particular expectations that European activists had in relation to 
the ‘true’ peasant identity of non-Western participants. Using Lugones’s concepts 
of the pilgrimage and the streetwalker, the chapter will then develop alternative, 
decolonial understandings (and spatial imaginaries) of the potential for resistance 
of the ICC (and global protest movements more generally). I will argue that giving 
greater space to nonhuman realities enables us to make better sense of oppressed 
experience, and to subordinate our thinking about objectives and strategies to the 
understandings that emerge out of long-winded, intersubjective, (human and non-
human) body-to-body encounters. The latter, I maintain with Lugones, have the 
potential of challenging our (colonial) frames of understanding domination, our 
own identity and, most importantly, our perception of the Other. 
 Finally, given that this book has emerged out of a project in transition (cf. 
the Preface), the Conclusion will serve to provide a retrospective reflection on 
the themes that have come to the fore while writing the book. It will make new 
connections between those themes, both in relation to anti-GMO argument and 
practice, and in relation to the different conceptual resources that I have used 
throughout. Because this book also serves to make practical suggestions about 
how to concretely move forward in environmental/anti-GMO activism, the Con-
clusion will end with a seven-point activist ‘manifesto’. 
 Notes 
 1 That said, a 2014 YouGov poll showed that 41 percent of the British population remain 
sceptical about GMOs, with only 17 percent being openly in favour (Jordan, 
2014). Similarly, according to UK Government polling in 2015, only one in three of the 
British public supported nuclear power at that point, which was lower than in 
previous years (Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2015). However, what 
interests me is the particular reasoning that environmentalists such as Monbiot and 
Lynas provide, not to what extent this belief is anchored in the beliefs of the general 
public. 
 2 I use the term ‘non-modern’ as it is employed by María Lugones (2010). Drawing on 
Juan R. Aparicio and Mario Blaser, Lugones defines ‘modern’ as denying ‘the 
challenge of the existence of other worlds with different ontological 
presuppositions’ (ibid.: 749). The ‘non-modern’ is precisely what is denied and yet 
becomes co-constitutive. Lugones uses that term in contrast to the concept of the 
‘pre-modern’, which, she says, is already subject to the modern, categorising logic 
(ibid.: 743). 
 3 It needs to be acknowledged though that Chandler and Reid’s (forthcoming) article 
rightly critiques the problem of focusing  solely  on Indigenous knowledge as a 
question of ontology. Chandler and Reid very well point out how such an approach is 
in danger of ignoring the actual state of dispossession, dependency and brokenness 
of Indigenous communities, caused by decades of exploitation. However, decolonial 
scholars are well aware of that – they do not confine their analysis of power to the 
cultural realm but precisely argue that the coloniality of power is about the 
interwining of epistemological and socioeconomic oppression in the project of 
modernity (see e.g. Quijano, 2007). 
 4 The generality and metaphysical dimension of this challenge is precisely what other 
scholars interested in new understandings of matter/materiality and nonhuman agency 
critique. See for example Bruce Braun and Sarah Whatmore’s (2010) questioning of 
what they call Jane Bennett’s metaphysical vitalism, which they contrast with the sug-
gested need for an analysis of the ‘specificity of the matter at hand’ (ibid.: xxix–xxx). See 
also Abrahamsson, Bertoni and Mol (2015) for a similar critique. However, though this is a 
worthwhile and interesting controversy, my aim of challenging the coloniality of 
knowledge makes me turn to precisely those scholars who are interested in wider 
philosophical development rather than ethnographic specificity. 
 5 It needs to be said that in  Facing the Planetary: Entangled Humanism and the Politics 
of Swarming  Connolly (2017) engages in great detail with forces of domination, and 
also draws in an exemplary manner on non-Western thought and perspectives for that 
purpose. His book overall provides an impressive, successful attempt to tackle the prob-
lem of human exceptionalism and what he calls ‘sociocentrism’ that is found in both 
those approaches that see planetary forces as an ‘environment’ for human existence 
as well as those environmentalists that disregard the autonomy of nonhuman forces 
beyond human impact. However, various problems remain. One of them is Connolly’s 
occasional tendency to reify and take as authoritative the truth-claims of scientific ‘dis-
coveries’ and ‘new’ scientific knowledge. Secondly, despite Connolly’s attempt to reach 
out to non-Western scholars and knowledges, it is striking that this is largely confined to 
the last two chapters in which he fleshes out the practical implications of his politics of 
swarming. Indeed, the conceptual work in the first four chapters remains confined to an 
engagement with largely Western scholars and Western scientists – despite the overlaps 
that much of Connolly’s writing here has with indigenous thinkers such as E. Richard 
(Umeek), Vine Deloria Jr, Taiaiake Alfred, or Paula Gunn Allen. Zoe Todd’s (2016) 
critique of Latour as failing to engage any indigenous conceptions of ‘Gaia’ applies, in that 
sense, also to Connolly’s concept of ‘entangled humanism’. 
 6 Some scholars might object that the concept of ‘spokespersonship’ once again focuses 
too much on human agency. 
 7 I am grateful to Andrew Barry for a very interesting conversation about how Latour’s 
enthusiasm about the new Constitution is potentially related to the general French enthu-
siasm about constitutionalism, which again needs to be seen against the background of 
the overall French inability to atone for its past imperialism. Cf. Barry (2005). 
 8 ‘De-linking’ replaces Mignolo’s earlier emphasis on the need for ‘border thinking’. For 
the latter see Mignolo (2000). 
 9 I am grateful to Rahul Rao for putting it that distinctly in a conference panel 
discussion. 
